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EXEMPTING THE MENTALLY RETARDED FROM THE
DEATH PENALTY: A COMMENT ON FLORIDA'S
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
V. STEPHEN COHEN
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1989, in Penry v. Lynaugh,' the United States Supreme Court
held that the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause2 does not prohibit the execution of a mentally retarded person
convicted of a capital felony.' Recognizing the unique plight faced by
the mentally retarded, four states reacted to the Court's decision by
passing legislation explicitly exempting these individuals from the
death penalty.4 In 1990 and 1991, similar legislation was proposed in
Florida, but died before being considered by the full House and Sen-
ate.5 The legislation will be proposed again in 1992.6
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss legislation prohibiting
the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded and to
provide reasons for this type of legislation in Florida. The Comment
begins by defining mental retardation, giving a brief history of the
treatment of the mentally retarded, and discussing certain characteris-
tics exhibited by the mentally retarded that have important implica-
tions for the criminal justice system. Next, the Comment gives an
overview of Supreme Court decisions relevant to the issues of mental
retardation and the death penalty and the legislative reactions to
Penry. Finally, the Comment analyzes Florida's proposed legislation
and explains why the Florida Legislature should pass the bill.
1. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
4. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.140 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 412(f)(1) (Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-203 (Supp. 1990). Georgia enacted similar legislation in 1986. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-
131(j) (Supp. 1988).
5. See infra note 129. The bills' legislative sponsors were Representative Dixie N. Sansom,
Republican, Satellite Beach, and Senator Bob Johnson, Republican, Sarasota.
6. See Fla. SB 42 (1992). The bill's legislative sponsor is Senator Bob Johnson, Republi-
can, Sarasota.
458 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 19:457
II. BACKGROUND
A. Mental Retardation Defined
In order to grasp the unique issues facing the courts and legislatures
concerning the mentally retarded, one must understand what mental
retardation means. The American Association on Mental Deficiency
(AAMD), the principal professional organization in the field of men-
tal retardation research, defines mental retardation as "significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental
period." 7 Intellectual functioning is measured by Intelligence Quotient
(IQ) testing.8 A person with an IQ of seventy or below functions at a
significantly subaverage intellectual level.9 Adaptive behavior refers to
one's ability to meet the accepted standards of learning, maturation,
personal independence, social responsibility and communication, and
daily living skills expected of one's age level and cultural group.' 0 In-
dividuals must exhibit an IQ of seventy or below and display signifi-
cant limitations in adaptive behavior before their eighteenth birthday
to be considered mentally retarded." The AAMD's definition has
been adopted by American courts, 12 legislatures,' 3 and other profes-
sional organizations. 14
The effects of mental retardation on an individual's ability to func-
tion in the everyday world depends, to a great extent, upon intellec-
tual deficits. Four categories of mental retardation are recognized
based on cognitive ability." The categories are mild (IQ 50-55 to 70),
7. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION I (H.
Grossman ed. 1983) [hereinafter AAMDJ. There are numerous causes of mental retardation,
including biological and environmental factors. AM. PsYCmATRC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STA-
TISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 29 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM I1].
8. AAMD, supra note 7, at I. IQ tests include the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Chil-
dren-Revised, Stanford Binet, and Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children. DSM III, supra
note 7, at 28.
9. AAMD, supra note 7, at 1.
10. DSM III, supra note 7, at 28-29. The devices used to measure adaptive behavior include
the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales and the American Association of Mental Deficiency
Adaptive Behavior Scales. Id. at 29.
11. The period of time between conception and the eighteenth birthday defines "the devel-
opmental period." AAMD, supra note 7, at 1.
12. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.l (1989); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985).
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 393.063(41) (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a)
(Supp. 1990).
14. See, e.g., DSM III, supra note 7, at 32-33.
15. AAMD, supra note 7, at 13.
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moderate (IQ 35-40 to 50-55), severe (IQ 20-25 to 35-40), and pro-
found (IQ below 20-25).I6
"Borderline" mental retardation refers to an IQ between 70 and
85. 17 People within this range are no longer considered mentally re-
tarded. 8 These classifications can be misleading, however. For exam-
ple, people with "mild" mental retardation are commonly confused
with those who were previously labeled "borderline" retarded.' 9 At-
torneys and judges, who are unfamiliar with mental retardation, often
share the same confusion and "incorrectly believe an individual who
is mildly mentally retarded is not seriously disabled and requires no
special attention from the criminal justice system.'' 20
It is important to remember that the terms "mild," "moderate,"
"severe," and "profound" are simply comparative words used by
mental health professionals to distinguish between different categories
of the mentally retarded.2 Whether a mentally retarded individual is
classified as mild or as profound, the substantial limitations in cogni-
tive ability and adaptive behavior produced by mental retardation se-
verely reduce the ability of every mentally retarded person to perform
in the everyday world.?
B. History of Treatment of the Mentally Retarded in the United
States
In the past, mental retardation and the problems associated with it
were largely misunderstood. This ignorance led to stereotyping, dis-
crimination, and mistreatment of retarded people in America that has
been described by the United States Supreme Court as "grotesque. '23
In the early part of this century, the mentally retarded were viewed
as the "principal source of criminal and immoral behavior" in soci-
ety.24 To deal with this perceived threat, sterilization and permanent
16. Id. Mild, moderate, severe, and profound mental retardation account for 85%, 10%,
3%-4%, and 1%-2%, respectively, of the total population of mentally retarded individuals.
DSM III, supra note 7, at 32-33.
17. Blume & Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REv. 725, 731 (1988).
18. Id. at 732.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 731 n.23.
21. Id. at 731.
22. See infra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
23. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
24. Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
414, 417 (1985).
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segregation from society were proposed to contain mental retardation
and to protect the "normal" population. 21 Between 1907 and 1931,
twenty-nine states enacted mandatory eugenic sterilization laws aimed
at curbing mental retardation. 26
By the 1950s, attitudes toward the mentally retarded in the United
States began to change. There was common agreement that no signifi-
cant link existed between mental retardation and criminality. 27 The
1960s and 1970s saw a great deal of progress toward recognizing the
rights of mentally retarded citizens. President Kennedy's Panel on
Mental Retardation began to focus the public's attention on the
unique needs of the mentally retarded.2 The Education of the Handi-
capped Act29 mandated public education for mentally retarded chil-
dren that "emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs. ' 30 Other legislation "outlawed discrimina-
tion against the mentally retarded in federally funded programs'' a
and "provided the retarded with the right to receive 'appropriate
treatment, services, and habilitation' in a setting that is 'least restric-
tive of [their] personal liberty." 32
III. THE MENTALLY RETARDED AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Although it is clear that great strides have been made toward under-
standing mental retardation and the special needs associated with it,
America's criminal justice system is still struggling with the unique is-
sues presented by mentally retarded defendants. 3  The safeguards im-
plemented to protect defendants with "normal" intelligence from
unfair treatment within the criminal justice system are not adequate to
protect the mentally retarded. In addition, it is important to remem-
ber that mental retardation involves more than subaverage intelli-
gence. Professors James W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckasson have
25. Id. at 419 (citing P. TYOR & L. BELL, CARING FOR THE RETARDED IN AMERICA: A His-
TORY 105-22 (1984)).
26. Blume & Bruck, supra note 17, at 751-52 (citing J. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERnLZATION
303 (1932)); Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 24, at 419 n.25.
27. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 24, at 420.
28. Id. (citing President's Panel on Mental Retardation, Report of the Task Force on Law
31-41 (1963)).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988).
30. Id. § 1400(c).
31. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 794).
32. Id. (citing Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6010(1). (2)).
33. For an in-depth discussion of the mentally retarded in the criminal justice system, see
Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 24.
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identified several traits, common among people with mental retarda-
tion, that have "important implications for the criminal justice sys-
tem."
First, mental retardation impairs communication skills and mem-
ory.35 The communication ability of the mentally retarded ranges from
no expressive or receptive skills to communication skills that appear
normal. 36 However, even retarded individuals whose communication
skills appear normal may not be reliable participants in court proceed-
ings.17 The reduced intellectual ability of the mentally retarded makes
understanding simple questions difficult for them. Further, the men-
tally retarded are "predisposed to 'biased responding' or answering in
the affirmative questions regarding behaviors they believe are desira-
ble, and answering in the negative questions concerning behaviors
they believe are prohibited. ' 3 Thus, the way a question is posed by a
police officer, lawyer, or judge can inadvertently-or intentionally-
cause an accused mentally retarded person to provide an inaccurate
answer.39 Also, many mentally retarded people have limited memory
recall, 4° making it difficult for those mentally retarded persons
charged with a crime to aid in their own defense. 41
Second, many mentally retarded people have poor impulse control,
which appears to be related to problems in attention. 42 Often they
have difficulty weighing the consequences of their actions, and they
act without considering those consequences. 43 The limited attention
spans exhibited by many mentally retarded people impede their ability
to focus on specific events and impede their ability to understand the
gravity of certain situations."
Third, people with mental retardation often "have incomplete or
immature concepts of blameworthiness and causation. ' 4 Many men-
tally retarded people place blame where it is not deserved and are una-
34. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 24, at 427-32.
35. Id. at 428-29.
36. Id. at 428.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. "This is particularly true of events which the individual had not identified as impor-
tant." Id.
41. Id. at 428-29.
42. Id. at 429. These problems involve impaired attention span, focus, and selectivity in the
attention process. Id.
43. Blume & Bruck, supra note 17, at 733.
44. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 24, at 429.
45. Id.
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ble to understand the link between an action and its consequences. 46
People with mental retardation can tell "right" from "wrong. ' 47
They cannot, however, apply these abstract concepts to specific fac-
tual settings .4
Fourth, mental retardation affects self-concept and self-percep-
tion.49 The mentally retarded often overrate their own skills, "either
out of a genuine misreading of their own abilities or out of defensive-
ness about their handicap." 50 Also, mentally retarded individuals
commonly deny their disability.5' Many individuals with mental retar-
dation are effective at hiding their condition, making detection diffi-
cult.5 2
Finally, most mentally retarded people do not have the same gen-
eral knowledge as people with "normal" intelligence. 3 The limited
cognitive ability of the mentally retarded and the special education
programs designed for them do not allow people with mental retarda-
tion to gain a broad, general understanding about the world. 4
In summary, mental retardation is a severe and permanent mental
impairment that affects almost every aspect of a mentally retarded
person's life .... [T]o be mentally retarded is to be forced to live in
a "nonretarded" world which neither understands nor allows for
such a crippling mental handicap. And that means the life of a
mentally retarded person, left to his own devices, is filled with
confusion, frustration, shame, and fear. The difference in the
cognitive abilities of a mentally retarded person, as opposed to one
of "normal intelligence, " is sufficient to make the difference one of
kind, not of degree.5
When one considers these characteristics, it is easy to see why the
criminal justice system, created for people with "normal" intelli-
gence, "is often an inhospitable place for the mentally retarded defen-
dant."5 6
46. Id. at 429-30. Similarly, many mentally retarded people will "cheat to lose," accepting
blame for a crime they did not commit just to gain the favor of their accuser. Id. at 430.
47. Id. at 441 n. 137 (citing Empirical Study, The Mentally Retarded Offender in Omaha-
Douglas County, 8 CREIGHTON L. REv. 622, 646 (1975)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 430-31.
50. Id. at 430.
51. Id. This denial works against retarded people, particularly in a courtroom setting. Id.
52. See id. at 43 1.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Blume & Bruck, supra note 17, at 734 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 735.
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IV. THE DEATH PENALTY
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,"7 the United States Supreme Court
struck down Georgia's death penalty statute. 8 The Court found that
the sentencing procedures provided by the statute created a substantial
risk that the death penalty would be inflicted in an arbitrary, capri-
cious, and possibly discriminatory manner.5 9 Thus, the statute, as ap-
plied, violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. 60 Furman effectively invalidated every death pen-
alty statute in existence at the time.
In 1976, the Court revisited the capital punishment issue. 6' In Gregg
v. Georgia, the Court upheld a modified version of Georgia's death
penalty statute. 6 The modified statute provides a "bifurcated pro-
ceeding" in capital punishment cases. During the first phase, the trier
of fact determines guilt or innocence. 63 Upon a verdict or plea of
guilty of one of the enumerated capital offenses, the same trier of
fact, in a separate proceeding, considers the imposition of the death
penalty." This second phase is commonly referred to as the "sentenc-
ing phase." To impose the death penalty, at least one of ten aggravat-
ing factors must be present. 65 These factors are weighed against
mitigating factors to determine the propriety of the death penalty for
a specific defendant." The statute provides an automatic appeal to the
Georgia Supreme Court.67
57. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
58. Id. at 239-40.
59. See id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). The statute gave the sentencer virtually un-
bridled discretion in sentencing decisions. Id.
60. Id. at 239-40.
61. The Court reexamined the issue in five companion cases: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). The
statutes in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek provided bifurcated capital punishment proceedings and
were upheld by the Court. The statutes in Woodson and Roberts, however, were struck down
because they provided for a mandatory death sentence for certain crimes.
62. 428 U.S. at 207. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101, -1311, -1902, -2001, -2201, -3301
(1972).
63. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163.
64. Id. at 163-64.
65. Id. at 164-66. The aggravating factors include: prior convictions, a murder committed
during the commission of a capital felony, a high level of danger to the public, whether the act
was committed for monetary gain, whether the victim was involved in law enforcement, whether
the offender caused another to commit the crime, whether the act involved torture, whether the
victim was a peace officer or firefighter, whether the defendant was an escaped convict, or
whether the murder was committed to avoid arrest. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975).
66. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164.
67. Id. at 166.
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Gregg made it clear that the death penalty is not per se unconstitu-
tional.61 Imposition of the death penalty in specific instances does not
violate society's "evolving standards of decency," the standard used
by the Court to test the validity of a punishment under the eighth
amendment. 69 The Court looks primarily to existing state legislation to
define these "evolving standards, "70 and the decision in Gregg empha-
sizes that, when considering capital punishment, great deference will
be given to state legislatures. 7'
The Supreme Court's decisions after Gregg have narrowed the class
of defendants upon which the death penalty may be imposed. The
Court has held that the execution of youths under the age of sixteen, 72
and of the insane,73 violates the eighth amendment. 74 The Court, how-
ever, has refused to extend this same protection to the mentally re-
tarded .71
A. Capital Punishment and Youth
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,7 6 the Supreme Court recognized a defen-
dant's youth as an important mitigating factor in a death penalty pro-
ceeding. 77 The Court found that "youth is more than a chronological
68. Id. at 169.
69. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
70. Id. at 174-76.
71. Id. at 186-92. The Court stated:
In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature that capital pun-
ishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong. Considerations of federal-
ism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its
particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility
as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that
the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and
thus is not unconstitutionally severe.
Id. at 186-87.
72. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
73. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
74. In Ford, Justice Powell offered what has become the accepted definition of insane peo-
ple: "those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to
suffer it." Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
"Insanity" is a common law term. Today the insane are commonly referred to as "mentally
ill." Mental illness and mental retardation are often confused. They are, however, different dis-
orders. Mental illness has nothing to do with intellectual capacity. The mentally retarded are, by
definition, individuals with low intelligence levels. Mental illness can be sporadic and, with
proper treatment, can often be cured. Mental retardation is permanent. While the mentally re-
tarded can usually be trained to live and function in society without constant supervision, a
person with mental retardation can never be cured of the condition. See Ellis & Luckasson,
supra note 24, at 423-24.
75. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
76. 455 U.S. 104(1982).
77. Id. at 115.
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fact. It is a time and a condition of life when a person may be most
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage." 7
Six years later, the Court again considered the special circumstances
of youth. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,79 the Court held that the eighth
amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the
execution of children under the age of sixteen.80 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the Court looked to society's evolving standards of decency,8'
the diminished culpability of minors, 82 and the recognized goals of
capital punishment . 3
Regarding the evolving standards of decency, the Court looked at
legislative treatment of children, at the behavior of juries when deal-
ing with children, and at "societal values" to determine that a na-
tional consensus exists against executing this class of citizens.8 The
Court next found that adolescents lack the culpability necessary to
warrant society's ultimate punishment. 5 "[A]dolescents as a class are
less mature ... than adults." ' 86 Adolescents are also less blamewor-
thy.8 7 Because of inexperience, less education, and less intelligence,
children are unable to evaluate consequences and are more easily mo-
tivated by emotion and by peer pressure.88
Finally, the Court considered the two principal social purposes of
the death penalty and concluded that they were not furthered by the
execution of this class of persons.89 The Court found that "[gliven the
lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for
growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its children," the goal
of retribution is not served by executing children under the age of six-
teen.90 The deterrence rationale is equally unacceptable, as most chil-
dren under the age of sixteen, when weighing the consequences of an
act, cannot make the type of cost-benefit analysis necessary to be de-
terred.9' Accordingly, the Court exempted children under the age of
78. Id.
79. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
80. Id. at 838. While the Court has shown leniency to children under the age of 16, it has
refused to exempt children over the age of 16. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
81. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821.
82. Id. at 833-38.
83. Id. The principal goals of capital punishment are retribution and deterrence. See also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
84. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-33.
85. Id. at 834-38.
86. Id. at 834.
87. Id. at 835.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 836-38.
90. Id. at 836-37.
91. Id. at 837-38.
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sixteen from the death penalty. The Court reached the same result
when considering the execution of insane people.
B. Capital Punishment and the Insane
In Ford v. Wainwright,92 the Court held that the execution of an
insane individual constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.93 How-
ever, there was no consensus regarding the rationale behind the hold-
ing. 94 The plurality noted that common law prohibited execution of
the insane 5 and that most state legislatures exempt the insane from
the death penalty. 96 The Court also noted that imposition of the death
penalty could have no retributive or deterrent effect on people who
can neither comprehend why they are being executed nor participate
in their own defense." Finally, the Court found that executing an in-
sane individual simply offends humanity. 9
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the eighth amendment
to ban the execution of the insane and of children under the age of
sixteen, it has declined to extend the same protections to the mentally
retarded, a similar class of defendants. 99
C. Capital Punishment and Mental Retardation: Penry v. Lynaugh
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held that executing a mentally re-
tarded individual is not a per se violation of the eighth amendment."'0
John Paul Penry was convicted in Texas of brutally murdering his
92. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
93. Id. at 409-10.
94. Id. at 407. The Court stated: "the reasons for the rule are less sure and less uniform
than the rule itself." id.
95. Id. at 406-07.
96. Id. at 408-09 n.2.
97. Id. at 409.
98. Id.
99. Many scholars argue that the same justifications for exempting youth and the insane
from capital punishment are applicable to the mentally retarded. Like youth and the insane,
people with mental retardation exhibit lesser culpability and are often unable to understand the
consequences of an action. Further, it is doubtful whether the goals of retribution and deterrence
can legitimately be applied to the mentally retarded. Finally, the concept of "mental age" is
currently being debated in the literature. This theory proposes that an adult with the intellectual
development of a child "cannot function in terms of reasoning and understanding beyond the
level of an average child of the age at which the adult's mental development is assessed." Blume
& Bruck, supra note 17, at 747; see also Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 24, at 432-44. Thus, just
as children are exempted, the mentally retarded who function at the level of children should also
be exempted.
100. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
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neighbor and was sentenced to death. 10' At various times in his life,
measurements of Penry's IQ had yielded scores between fifty and
sixty-three.'0 2 He had the mental age of a child of six and one-half
years and the social maturity of a child of nine or ten years.° 3
In reaching its conclusion, the Court again noted that cruel and un-
usual punishment recognizes the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."'° To define those evolving
standards, the Court examined both capital punishment statutes deal-
ing with the mentally retarded and public opinion polls. 0 5 The Court
noted that, at the time of the Penry decision, only Georgia's Legisla-
ture had exempted the mentally retarded from capital punishment. 106
The Court also noted that public opinion polls conducted in Texas,
Florida, and Georgia showed that the majority of people oppose exe-
cuting the mentally retarded.1°7 After considering these facts, the
Court stated that "at present, there is insufficient evidence of a na-
tional consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted
of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment."' 08
The Court in Penry also discussed the accepted goals of punish-
ment.' 9 For retribution to be a valid goal, a nexus between the pun-
ishment and the defendant's blameworthiness must exist." 0 The Court
recognized that mental retardation does diminish an individual's cul-
pability and that most states recognize mental retardation as a mitigat-
ing factor in criminal prosecutions."' However, the abilities of people
with mental retardation vary widely." '2 Although the Court admitted
that it would be cruel and unusual to execute an individual who is
101. Id. at 310. While the Court found that it is not unconstitutional to execute a mentally
retarded defendant, the case was remanded because the Court determined that the jury, due to
faulty jury instructions, had been unable to give full effect and consideration to the mitigating
evidence brought forth by Penry. Id. at 328.
102. Id. at 307.
103. Id. at 308. Penry was 22 years old at the time of the crime.
104. Id. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
105. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331-35. The Court considered state legislation and data regarding
jury sentencing behavior to be the best and most objective evidence of societal values. Id. at 331.
106. Id. at 334. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Supp. 1988) (prohibits execution of the men-
tally retarded). At the time of this decision, the Maryland Legislature had enacted a similar
statute, but it had not taken affect. Penry, 492 U.S at 334. The federal government also bans the
execution of the mentally retarded. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (I) (1991).
107. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35.
108. Id. at 335.
109. Id. at 335-36.
110. Id. at 336.
111. Id. at 337-38.
112. Id. at 338.
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severely or profoundly retarded,"' it refused to hold that no mentally
retarded person could have the requisite culpability to be sentenced to
death. "4
Thus, the Supreme Court refused to provide a blanket exemption
from the death penalty for the mentally retarded. Although Penry
does offer hope for people exhibiting severe and profound retarda-
tion, the decision does nothing to protect people with mild or moder-
ate retardation.
In Penry, the Court stood by its "long-standing belief that most
aspects of capital punishment are properly questions for the states.""' 5
After Penry, the issue of imposing the death penalty on the mentally
retarded was raised in state legislatures across the country.
V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO PENRY
In reaction to Penry, Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico, and Ten-
nessee passed legislation exempting mentally retarded people from the
death penalty." 6 As previously noted, Georgia passed similar legisla-
tion in 1988.1 7
The statutes' chief provisions are similar. They expressly adopt the
AAMD's definition of mental retardation 18 and prohibit the execu-
tion of people who come within that definition. It is important to note
that none of these statutes preclude punishing the mentally retarded
for capital offenses. In fact, every version except Tennessee's provides
a mandatory sentence of life in prison for mentally retarded indivi-
113. Id. at 333. The Court stated:
The common law prohibition against punishing "idiots" [people who cannot form the
requisite intent to commit a crime or who cannot understand the difference between
good and evil] for their crimes suggests that it may indeed be "cruel and unusual"
punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or severely retarded and wholly
lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions.
Id.
114. Id. at 340.
115. Comment, Consistency in the Application of the Death Penalty to Juveniles and the
Mentally Impaired: A Suggested Legislative Approach, 58 U. CN. L. Rav. 211, 222 (1989).
116. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.140 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 412(f)(1) (Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
203 (Supp. 1990).
117. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Supp. 1988). The Georgia statute was a response to
public outrage over the 1986 execution of Jerome Bowden, a mentally retarded man with an IQ
of 59.
118. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (Supp. 1991); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(e)(3) (Supp. 1990) (Maryland's
statute extends the developmental period to the age of 22); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(A)
(1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203.
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duals convicted of capital crimes.119 The statutes simply recognize the
manifest unfairness that results from subjecting individuals with lim-
ited culpability and limited moral blameworthiness to society's ulti-
mate penalty.
A. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty in Florida
Florida's death penalty statute is similar to the statute that was
challenged and upheld in Gregg v. Georgia.120 It provides a bifurcated
procedure with the initial step determining guilt or innocence and the
second, separate step determining the sentence.' 2 ' During the sentenc-
ing phase, the same trier of fact is to take into consideration the ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances presented by the parties and
determine the appropriateness of the death penalty.'12 In Florida's
scheme, mental retardation is not an explicit mitigating factor.
The Florida Supreme Court has not decided whether executing the
mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Florida Constitution.' 23 Thus far, the court has avoided ruling on the
issue. However, the cases dealing with the mentally retarded and the
death penalty that have been decided "indicate that the [court] views
mental retardation as merely one aspect of the defendant's character.
It has not yet come to grips with the reality that this learning disorder
defines the person."''
B. Florida's Proposed Legislation
In 1990 and in 1991, legislation was introduced in both the Florida
House of Representatives and the Florida Senate that would have pro-
hibited the execution of the mentally retarded.'2 The language in the
original versions of the proposed bills was similar to the language of
legislation in the five states that have already exempted the mentally
retarded from capital punishment. Senate Bill 2226 (1991) would have
119. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (Supp. 1991); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.140(2) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(f)(2) (Supp.1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
20A-2.1(c) (1991).
120. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (Supp. 1990).
121. Id. § 921.141(1).
122. Id. § 921.141(3), (5), (6).
123. For a thorough discussion of the Florida Supreme Court's treatment of the issue, see
Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status of Florida Law, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1991, at 12,
14-15.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Fla. SB 2226 (1991); Fla. HB 657 (1991); Fla. CS for HB 657 (1991); Fla. HB 3029
(1990); Fla. SB 1242 (1990). The bills' legislative sponsors were Representative Dixie N. Sansom,
Republican, Satellite Beach, and Senator Bob Johnson, Republican, Sarasota.
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amended section 921.141(l)(a), Florida Statutes, to read in pertinent
part:
Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital
felony, the court, upon motion of the defendant, shall conduct a
separate.. . proceeding to determine whether the defendant should
be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without consideration of
a sentence of death due to the defendant's allegation that he suffers
from retardation, as defined in s. 393.063. A defendant who
establishes by a preponderance of evidence that he meets the
definition in s. 393.063 shall be sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for a minimum of 25 years .... A
determination of retardation made pursuant to this paragraph does
not act as an adjudication of incompetence or dismissal of any
criminal charge or conviction.'26
Section 393.063, Florida Statutes, cited in the Senate bill, deals with
public health and adopts the AAMD's definition of mental retarda-
tion. 27
In both 1990 and 1991, the proposed legislation met strong opposi-
tion from Florida prosecutors 2 and was killed before it reached the
full House and Senate. 2 9 The prosecutors believed that the bill, if
passed, would provide anti-death penalty activists a means of further
delaying an already overburdened and slow-moving system. 3° State
prosecutors also fear that individuals who are not mentally retarded
will claim to have the condition to avoid the death penalty.' 3' This
126. Fla. SB 2226 § (1)(a) (1991). House Bill 657 (1991), the companion legislation to Senate
Bill 2226, was similar to the Senate bill in all relevant respects. The House bill, however, reached
the Committee on Criminal Justice before it died on the calendar on May 2, 1991. FLA. LEGIS.,
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1991 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BI.S at 62, HB 657. The
Senate bill died in the Committee on Criminal Justice on the same day. Id., HISTORY OF SENATE
BI.Ls at 266, SB 2226. The Committee amended the House bill by redefining mental retardation
to include only those individuals with IQs of 65 or less. Fla. CS for HB 657 (1991). The revised
definition contained no requirement for limitations in adaptive behavior. The basis for this re-
vised definition is unclear. As discussed in section II(A) of this Comment, the AAMD's defini-
tion of mental retardation, included in the Senate bill and the original House bill, is regarded as
the accepted definition of mental retardation.
127. See supra text accompanying note 7.
128. Interview with Mrs. Chris Schuh, Exec. Dir., Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of Fla., in
Tallahassee (May 1, 1991).
129. See FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1991 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 62, HB 657; id., HISTORY OF SENATE BiLLS at 266, SB 2226; FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF
LEGISLATION, 1990 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 453, HB 3029; id., HISTORY OF
SENATE BIL.S at 117, SB 1242.
130. Internal memorandum, Dep't of Legal Affairs, Crim. Appeals Div., Dir.'s Office,
(Apr. 4, 1990) (on file at Florida State Univ. College of Law Library).
131. Id.
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could confuse issues and make it more difficult to impose the death
penalty on deserving defendants.3 2 Finally, Florida prosecutors argue
that the safeguards built into the current system are adequate to pro-
tect the mentally retarded from the death penalty. 3 Despite the prose-
cutors' fears, similar legislation will be proposed in 1992.134
Florida should follow the lead of the five states that have already
passed this progressive legislation and adopt the bill. As discussed be-
low, public opinion in Florida disfavors imposition of capital punish-
ment on the mentally retarded. Neither the goal of deterrence nor the
goal of retribution is furthered by the execution of a retarded person.
Further, Florida's criminal justice system is ill-equipped to deal with
the special issues presented by mentally retarded defendants. The sys-
tem cannot ensure that a mentally retarded individual will receive the
fair trial that is an absolute requirement when any defendant faces
society's most severe penalty.
1. Public Opinion
The majority of Floridians oppose execution of mentally retarded
defendants. While polls show that eighty-four percent of Florida's
population favor capital punishment, the same polls show that sev-
enty-one percent oppose the death penalty for the mentally re-
tarded. 35 Further, Florida's treatment of its retarded citizens over the
years has become increasingly understanding and compassionate. 36
The Florida Legislature has created special regulations to govern the
treatment of the mentally retarded, and "within the last five years the
legislature has enacted a 'bill of rights' for the mentally ill or mentally
retarded, which seeks to maintain the dignity and assure treatment for
such persons.' ' 37 This evidence shows an evolving trend in Florida to-
ward recognizing the unique circumstances of the mentally retarded
and toward providing the special protection they require.
2. Deterrence and Retribution
Imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded defendant
does not further the legitimate penal goals of capital punishment-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 6. Senate Bill 42, proposed for 1992, is the same as 1991's Senate Bill
2226 in all relevant respects.
135. Blume & Bruck, supra note 17, at 759 (citing Cambridge Survey Research, Inc., Atti-
tudes in the State of Florida on the Death Penalty: Public Opinion Survey 7, 61 (1986)).
136. Davis, supra note 123, at 15.
137. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 916.107 (1990)).
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deterrence and retribution.3 8 The threat of execution cannot deter a
mentally retarded defendant. To be deterred by execution, one must
be able to premeditate the crime and be capable of understanding the
penalty. The limited intelligence and impulsive behavior exhibited by
mentally retarded persons renders them incapable of the degree of
planning necessary for the imposition of the death penalty. 3 9 In addi-
tion, mentally retarded persons cannot appreciate the finality of
death. 140 Thus, applying the deterrence rationale to the mentally re-
tarded is dubious.
The other accepted goal of capital punishment is retribution.' 4' In-
herent in the idea of punishment as retribution is that the community
accepts the punishment as fair and that "the punishment is the just
deserts of the offense." 42 As previously discussed, a majority of Flor-
idians oppose the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally re-
tarded. To determine whether execution is a fair punishment for a
person, however, requires an examination of "personal responsibility
and moral guilt." 43 The debilitating characteristics of mental retarda-
tion severely reduce the level of personal responsibility for certain acts
that can be attributed to a mentally retarded individual.'" The men-
tally retarded display lower intelligence, limited communication and
memory skills, and less worldly knowledge than people with "nor-
mal" IQs. 45 Further, the mentally retarded are easily manipulated
and vulnerable to suggestion.' 46 Finally, the incomplete moral devel-
opment caused by mental retardation reduces their culpability. 47 For
these reasons, the goal of retribution cannot validly be achieved by
their execution.
3. Problems Within the Criminal Justice System
Florida's criminal justice system, designed for people with "nor-
mal" intelligence, is ill-equipped to deal with mentally retarded defen-
138. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1985).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
140. Blume & Bruck, supra note 17, at 743.
141. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 408.
142. Blume & Bruck, supra note 17, at 743.
143. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982)).
144. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 33-56.
146. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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dants. The current procedures cannot ensure that the rights of the
mentally retarded will be properly protected.
Few police officers, lawyers, or judges have any training in dealing
with the mentally retarded.' 4 Thus, mental retardation often goes un-
detected throughout the entire criminal justice process. 49 Even when
mental retardation is recognized, the characteristics unique to the
mentally retarded place them at a severe disadvantage in the criminal
justice system. 50
Mentally retarded defendants often waive their constitutional rights
without understanding the implications of their statements.', Also,
the mentally retarded often confess more quickly. 5 2 They tend to be
eager to please authority figures and can often be easily manipu-
lated. "'53 The incomplete concepts of causation and of culpability ex-
hibited by a person with mental retardation always places a cloud over
the validity of a confession. 54
Mental retardation hampers a defendant's ability to communicate
with police officers, lawyers, and the court.'55 Commonly, such defen-
dants cannot understand the questions put to them, and their vague,
unresponsive answers often lead judges and juries to view a mentally
retarded defendant as simply recalcitrant and uncooperative. 5 6
Finally, mentally retarded defendants often are unable to compre-
hend why they were thrown into the system in the first place. Once in,
their condition renders them unable to understand the proceedings
that will determine their fate. Their impaired intellectual ability and
limited memory deny them the ability to participate in their own de-
fense and severely hamper an attorney's efforts on their behalf.
"Thus, there is a substantial possibility that a mentally retarded per-
son may be convicted of a criminal offense, or even sentenced to
death, in a proceeding in which he is a virtual non-participant.""' 7 To
sentence a mentally retarded person to death under these circum-
stances is simply not acceptable in a society that values human life and
the integrity of its legal system so greatly.
148. Blume & Bruck, supra note 17, at 733-34.
149. Id. at 735.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 33-56.
151. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 24, at 446.
152. See id. at 445-52.
153. Id. at 446.
154. Id. at 445-52.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
156. Blume & Bruck, supra note 17, at 735.
157. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Treatment of the mentally retarded in our society is becoming in-
creasingly compassionate and understanding. Despite this trend, the
criminal justice system remains in the Dark Ages, imposing society's
severest punishment on individuals with limited intelligence and culpa-
bility-and imposing it without providing any special protection. The
United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the job of protect-
ing the mentally retarded from the death penalty lies with the state
legislatures.
Five states have exempted the mentally retarded from the death
penalty. Florida should join them. Florida's proposed legislation
would not exempt the mentally retarded from punishment, nor would
it weaken Florida's death penalty statute. The legislation simply rec-
ognizes that it is unduly harsh to execute a mentally retarded person
instead of applying other penalties that will both punish the guilty and
protect society.
